![]() There are also disagreements about how the value of virtue compares to that of other goods such as pleasure and knowledge, some thinking it the greatest of goods and others that it always has less value than its specific intentional object. ![]() Some such as Aristotle think the first application is primary, so to be virtuous an act must issue from a virtuous disposition others see the application to individual states as primary. We apply the concepts of virtue and vice both to standing dispositions or character traits and to individual desires and actions. ![]() A different, non-Aristotelian view grounds the intrinsic goodness of moral virtue in its fittingness to its intentional object, as in the positive attitude of desiring and pursuing a good such as another person’s pleasure. But both kinds of virtue can also be valued intrinsically and were so valued by Aristotle, for whom they exercised practical and theoretical rationality and thereby realised core aspects of human nature. Some philosophers identify the moral virtues instrumentally, as traits that promote an independently good life either for their possessor or, more plausibly, for her or for other people a parallel view says the intellectual virtues lead reliably to true belief. On both conceptions the value that makes a state virtuous or vicious can be either a matter of promoting some independent good or evil or a value the state has in itself. A narrower conception recognises only moral virtues. On a broad conception, virtue and vice are found in many aspects of our lives, so there are not only moral virtues such as benevolence and courage but also intellectual virtues such as skill in assessing evidence and perhaps physical ones, as are had by athletes. The concepts of virtue and vice identify a distinctive set of goods and evils, ones that are aspects of human excellence unlike, say, the values of feeling pleasure or pain.
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